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Abstract
The study investigates the decisions of fathers to use parental leave
at the individual level. The focus is on the opportunity cost fathers
would face for using the leave. Opportunity cost is measured in two
ways: as the difference between the parental leave benefit and the
salary of the father and as the mean salary growth for a period of six
months. The first measure is a proxy for the direct opportunity cost,
while the second aims to capture opportunity costs of being away from
the workplace in terms of foregone promotion opportunities. Data for
the analysis are based on anonymous administrative records of fathers
working in the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg. The analysis deploys a
duration model to investigate fathers’ use of parental leave throughout
an observation period of five years. The results of the study suggest
a negative, although non-linear, relationship between foregone income
and the hazard of taking parental leave. Surprisingly, however, salary
growth in the six-month period prior to taking parental leave has a
positive, rather than a negative effect on the hazard of taking parental
leave.
JEL-Classification: J130, J160
Keywords:Parental leave, work-family reconciliation, fatherhood
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1 Introduction and Literature Review
The study investigates the decisions of fathers to use parental leave at the
individual level. The research topic is important as policy-makers in indus-
trialized countries are increasingly looking for ways to increase the num-
ber of fathers using parental leave. Despite parental leave generally been
conceptualized as a gender-neutral work-family reconciliation measure, the
majority of leave users in industrialized countries are women(Plantenga and
Remery, 2005). Increasingly policy-makers and academics are recognizing
the importance of achieving a more equal distribution of paid and unpaid
work between men and women. The participation of men in parental leave
would mean that women would not be the sole bearers of all negative con-
sequences associated with time spent out of the labor force. Fathers’ use
of parental leave has been linked to higher probability for couples to have
more children in Sweden and Norway (Duvander, Lappeg˚a rd, and Ander-
sson, 2010). In addition, parental leave provides an important opportu-
nity for fathers to strengthen their emotional connection with their children
(O’Brien, Brandth, and Kvande, 2007). There is evidence that fathers’
parental involvement is linked to positive outcomes for children (see Pat-
tnaik and Srirarm, 2010) and for their spouses (Lamb, Pleck, and Levine,
1986). Therefore it is important to understand what factors foster or pre-
vent the participation of men in parental leave and to concentrate policy
efforts accordingly.
Previous research on male use of parental leave is reviewed in Zhelyazkova
(2013). So far, it is well-established that variations in the policy design can
significantly affect male take up rates of parental leave. Earmarking part
of the leave for fathers on a use-it-or-lose it basis seems to have particulary
pronounced effects, as has been demonstrated by a number of “natural”
experiments, comparing take up rates before and after a reform (Ekberg,
Eriksson, and Friebel, 2013; Duvander and Johansson, 2012; Geisler and
Kreyenfeld, 2012).
Empirical research has also been carried out outside the quasi-experimental
framework, linking taking parental leave (or its duration) to explanatory
factors. Typically situated within the context of single countries, this stream
of research has provided a deeper understanding of the factors involved in
the decision-making of fathers and couples regarding use of parental leave.
Some main findings from such studies are that men are more likely to take
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leave for their first child, if their partner is more educated and if their partner
has (relatively) higher earnings(Nielsen, 2009; Geisler and Kreyenfeld, 2011;
Lappeg˚a rd, 2008; Sundstrom and Duvander, 2002).
Within the workplace, there is evidence that fathers’ working in the public
sector are more likely to use parental leave (Lappeg˚a rd, 2012; Nielsen, 2009).
Organizational size also matters, as for smaller organizations it is expected
to be harder to accommodate prolonged leaves of their employees (Anxo,
Fagan, Smith, Letablier, and Perraudin, 2007; Whitehouse, Diamond, and
Baird, 2007). In addition, research has pointed out the importance of the
sector of employment, scheduling of the work, age and gender-composition
of the company, etc.(Anxo et al., 2007). The study of Haas, Allard, and
Hwang (2010) further extends the analysis to company-level factors, which
are harder to measure, such as organizational culture and the extent to which
management was supportive of parenting values.
From a purely economic point of view, one could expect that the opportu-
nity cost of fathers to take parental leave, in terms of their foregone earnings
while on leave, would also be among the key predictors for use of leave. Inter-
estingly, however, previous empirical findings tend to suggest a rather non-
linear association between earnings level and probability of taking parental
leave. For example, in the study of
The present study positions the opportunity cost of every individual father
at the center of the analysis in order to extend previous understanding of the
role of income-levels for parental leave further. Opportunity cost is measured
in terms of two main components: direct foregone income and promotion op-
portunities, conceptualized as the average growth in each previous six-month
period. The analysis benefits from the opportunity to use anonymous ad-
ministrative records from the Grand-Duchy of Luxembourg, which provide
information about the income and growth of salary at every time point dur-
ing the whole period when a father is eligible to use parental leave on a
monthly basis. The longitudinal nature of the data makes it possible for the
effects of covariates to be traced even if they change over time, as informa-
tion from the entire period of observation can be used,as opposed to relying
on values at fixed points of time (typically before the birth). Furthermore,
the administrative records provide the rare opportunity to analyze parental
leave via knowledge of actual leave-taking as from the records, as opposed
to inferring parental leave based on general leave of absence from work or
self-reported data. Finally, researching the Luxembourg data, extends the
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knowledge of male use of parental leave to a new, previously unexplored
context. Although Luxembourg is a rather small country, its size and com-
position its workforce make it comparable to the workforce in a number of
European regions, especially around large cities (Brosius and Ray, 2012).
2 Background: Parental Leave in Luxembourg
The present research is situated in Luxembourg where parental leave take up
has not been researched before with the exception of a report for the Euro-
pean Commission prepared by Plasman and Sissoko (2005) and an evaluation
performed by KPMG Assurance Advisory Luxembourg (2002). The Lux-
embourg context is interesting because still in 2004 (only five years after the
introduction of parental leave in Luxembourg) men already constituted 17%
of parental leave users, which is amongst the higher figures for European
Union countries. In their report for the European Commission Plantenga
and Remery (2005) mention Luxembourg, amongst the Netherlands, Swe-
den, Iceland and Norway as the only countries where fathers’ take up rates
are above 10 per cent. Recent figures published in the report by the Luxem-
bourg Ministry of Family and Equality (2012) indicate a steeply increasing
rate of the share of male users of parental leave. For example, when the
scheme was first introduced in 1999, only 90 or 6.3 percent of the 1433 par-
ents using parental leave were men. In 2001, the share of men using parental
leave more than doubled to 13.7 percent of the 2297 total users, and in 2012
the share of male users was as high as 23.4 per cent out of a total number of
4025 parental leave users. In terms of take up rates, computed as users of
parental leave as a fraction of all who are eligible, the first available figure
is the one provided by
It is possible, that the policy design of the leave in Luxembourg could explain
this relatively high rate of male participation. In a comparative assessment
De Henau, Meulders, and O’Dorchai (2007) classified the parental leave
system in Luxembourg as being the best one (amongst the countries in the
analysis) in terms of its potential to achieve gender equality. The leave is
paid (although on a flat-rate basis) and equally divided between the two
parents. That is, each parent in Luxembourg has the individual and non-
transferable right to paid parental leave, which can be taken in a block of
six months full-time or twelve months part-time. This means that fathers’
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who take parental leave, take at for a minimum duration of six months. In
comparison, data on fathers’ take up of leave in Sweden show that on average
fathers took leave of duration equal to the minimum earmarked period of
about two months (Plantenga and Remery, 2005).
Parental leave in Luxembourg was introduced for the first time in 1999
following European Union requirements set out in European Directive of
96/34/EC of 3 June 1996. Updated information on leave policies in Lux-
embourg is published on an annual basis by the International Leave Net-
work (refer to Zhelyazkova and Loutsch, 2012). Presently, the parental leave
scheme gives working parents in Luxembourg the right to take either a block
of six months full-time parental leave or a block of twelve months part-time
leave for the purposes of caring for a young child at home. The leave can be
used up to the fifth birthday of the child and is an individual entitlement:
both parents have to right of leave (if they meet the eligibility conditions),
however, they cannot transfer it to each other. In addition, there is the
requirement that the first leave in a two-parent family must be taken imme-
diately after the maternity leave (the period immediately before and after
birth, which in Luxembourg is equal to four or five months fully compen-
sated from the national health care fund). If a parental leave is not taken
immediately after the maternity leave the right of the leave is forfeited, how-
ever, the second leave (in a case of family of two parents) can still be used
until the child turns five.
Parents who take parental leave are compensated on a flat-rate basis, mean-
ing that everyone receives the same compensation regardless of their previous
income. In 1999 the rate of compensation started out at 1496.11 EUR for
the full-time leave and half of the amount for the part-time leave. There
was an annual adjustment for inflation until 2007, when the compensation
rate was frozen at 1778.31 EUR and it has remained at this rate until the
time of writing this paper portail des statistiques (see 2013). The eligibility
requirements for the leave are a minimum of one year employment with the
same employer prior to the start of the leave and a reduction of at least 50%
of working hours in the case of taking the leave part-time. In accordance
with the European Directive of 96/34/EC of 3 June 1996, the leave is fully
job-protected and parents are guaranteed the right to return to the same or
an equivalent working position at the end of the leave.
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3 Conceptual Framework and Research Hypothe-
ses
According to the parental leave legislation in Luxembourg described in sec-
tion 2, fathers who work in Luxembourg can decide at any point of time
between the birth or adoption of their child until his or her fifth birthday
whether to use parental leave or not3. If the father does not use the leave
it is “lost”, as it is not possible that the mother uses it instead. The funda-
mental premise I base my analysis on, is that parental leave is an individual
entitlement and each father decides whether to use it or not during the five
period for which it is possible to use it. Thus I consider fathers within a
classical economic framework where they are rational agents who act to max-
imize utility. Therefore fathers decide whether to take leave or not based
on comparing their utility of taking the leave and remaining at home with
their child to the opportunity cost in terms of salary-related income or career
opportunities.
Due to the availability of detailed, accurate longitudinal earnings-related
data, the present study can contribute to the current understanding of how
men make decisions on taking parental leave by incorporating two measures
of opportunity cost. The first measure is the directly measurable cost in
terms of foregone earnings, which is equal to the pre-leave wage minus the
amount of the benefit. The second measure is conceptualized as a proxy
for foregone career development opportunities. It is measured through the
average rate of salary growth over the previous six months for each father.
The main hypothesis is that, for both measures of opportunity cost, higher
opportunity cost would be associated with lower likelihood of using parental
leave.
The analysis controls for family-related and workplace-related characteris-
tics of the fathers, which are available in the data and which have been
demonstrated to be important in previous studies. Within the family, I con-
trol for the parity of the birth, the presence of other children, the marital
3In principle, fathers face several constraints in this decision: that their partner cannot
be on parental leave during this time, that the earliest possibility to take the leave is
immediately after the end of the maternity(adoption) leave and that they will lose their
eligibility rights if they become unemployed or seize to be employed for a minimum of
20 hours. However, for simplicity, I ignore these constraints, as it is very difficult to
incorporate them into an estimation model.
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status of the father, the gender of the child and whether multiple births
occurred. In terms of work-related variables, I am able to incorporate infor-
mation on the size of the enterprize and the monthly hours of employment. I
also control for nationality and age, as they can also reveal some differences
in fathers’ labor market positions. For example, immigrants’ position on the
labor market could be less advantageous than that of natives
Unfortunately, the use of administrative records makes it impossible to use
education in the analysis. This is an important omission, as higher-educated
fathers are considered more likely to hold gender-egalitarian beliefs (Bolzen-
dahl and Myers, 2004) and, thus to share in household tasks (Nordenmark
and Nyman, 2003) or see Davis and Greenstein (2009) for an overview.
At the same time, however, education bears a direct relationship to fa-
thers’ work situation, as higher education is associated with higher earnings
(Brunello and Comi, 2004), which could suggest a higher opportunity cost
of using parental leave.
Finally a few words on the decision to analyze men individually and not
within the family unit. Positioning the analysis at the individual level is
somewhat different from the general trend in previous research, where male
use of parental leave is usually analyzed at the family level. Academic re-
search based on the life-course perspective(Elder Jr., 1994), has highlighted
the fact that lives of individuals are “linked”(Elder Jr., 1994) and decisions
concerning work and family are often made inter-dependently.
Economic frameworks used for analyzing male use of parental leave also tend
to analyze the decisions of fathers within the couple (see Zhelyazkova, 2013).
Many economic studies base their theoretical analysis economic frameworks
derived from Becker’s (1981) New Home Economics (Reich, Boll, and Lep-
pin, 2012) and bargaining theories (for example see: Amilon (2007)). In
both of these frameworks tasks related to the home production would be
performed by the spouse who earns less on the labor market. In the New
Home Economics reasoning this is due to the fact that this would allow the
couple as a unit to be more productive, while in the bargaining theories the
partner who has a higher earning power has a more favorable position in the
negotiation process of task distribution.
Generally approaches based on negotiations within the couple have been ap-
plied for Germany (Geisler and Kreyenfeld, 2011) or in Sweden (Sundstrom
and Duvander, 2002), where parental leave is a family-based right. In con-
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trast, in Luxembourg, parents are given an individual and non-transferable
right to leave, meaning that parents do not need to negotiate on sharing
the leave per se. Therefore, an individual approach to the analysis might be
more appropriate for the case of Luxembourg.
4 Data and Methods
4.1 Data
Data for the analysis are provided in the form of anonymous administrative
records from the Inspection ge´ne´rale de la se´curite´ sociale (IGSS) Luxem-
bourg. When working with administrative data, it is important to consider
that not everyone in the population has an administrative record. In the
case of the data used for this analysis, administrative records are available
only for persons working in Luxembourg or persons who have a relation
with the Luxembourg social security system. This means that naturally
excluded from the sample are Luxembourgish nationals who live or work
outside of Luxembourg, Luxembourg residents who are employed at the Eu-
ropean Union institutions in Luxembourg (as they are not included in the
national social security system). At the same time, however, information is
available for cross-border workers. In short, cross-border workers are per-
sons who are employed in Luxembourg, however, they commute daily to
their workplace from one of the neighboring countries where they live.
The analysis is based on a selected sample from the available administrative
records. The population of interest for the analysis is working parents,
as parental leave is a measure available to working parents only. For the
analysis, I selected all male employees in Luxembourg who:
 had a social security record for at least part of the period 2000− 2007
 had a child born in their fiscal household4 in 2003
4The fiscal households are artificially reconstructed households based on tax-related
documents. In rare cases it is possible that children in the fiscal household are not bio-
logical children, but children from a prior marriage of a spouse, grandchildren, nieces or
nephews.
9
 were working in Luxembourg and eligible to take parental leave at the
time when the child was born5
After applying the selections mentioned above the data set used for the
analysis contains the employment histories of 5827 men, who all had a child
born in their household in 20036.The year 2003 was chosen as pivotal time-
frame for the analysis, as data are available for the period 2000 − 2008 and
focusing on parents who had a child in 2003 allows for sufficient time periods
of observation both before and after the event of arrival of a new child in the
family. Focusing on parents who all had their child born in the same year,
makes comparison somewhat easier, as potential confounding factors, such
as other policy measures or the overall economic climate are held constant.
The administrative records contain socio-demographic, work and social secu-
rity related information for the entire period of observation. For each father
in the sample, there is information on his age, nationality and country of
residence. In addition, his marital status is known, as well as, the number
and ages of any other children in the household. There is also a detailed
record of the fathers’ labor force participation. For any given time point, it
is known what is his salary-related income, his employment status, number
of hours worked, the size of his enterprize and the some information about
the sector of his employment.
4.2 Analytical Approach
For the analysis, I apply event history modeling methods7, as they are de-
signed for questions related to the timing of occurrence of one or more events
of interest (for a recent overview see Mills, 2011). In event history analysis
models the dependent variable is either the duration until an event occurs
or the “hazard” rate (the probability that a particular event occurs at a
given time point, conditional on that that is has not already occurred). For
event history analysis one needs longitudinal data, a clearly defined event of
5Eligibility for the leave was defined according to the parental leave eligibility rules of
Luxembourg. Fathers who worked for the same employer for a minimum of one year and
for over 20 hour per week were considered eligible for taking parental leave
6The total number of fathers exceeds the number of children born in Luxembourg in
2003 because the data set contains also the career trajectories of cross-border workers.
7also called survival, duration or transition methods
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interest (or multiple events8) and a clearly defined starting point at which
everyone in the sample starts to be “at risk” of experiencing the event. The
data available in the monthly social security records of fathers in Luxem-
bourg allows for setting up an event history model as they are longitudinal.
For the model, I consider as the event of interest whether or not a father
takes parental leave. I consider fathers to be “at risk” for taking parental
leave from the month when the child is born in 2003.
With event history multivariate modeling, it is possible to investigate what
factors contribute to whether a father takes parental leave or not. In addi-
tion, if time-varying effects are incorporated, it is also possible to trace how
the rate of taking leave varies over time. The possibility to incorporate time-
varying covariates makes the analysis more precise, as the observation period
for five years is a substantial time span during which a number of impor-
tant factors in one’s family or employment status can change (for example,
more children can be born, or salary levels can increase, etc.). Event-history
analysis methods are common in the literature related to maternity leave,
parental leave or, in general, family-related career breaks. A number of stud-
ies have examined how soon after birth mothers return to work and the role
or parental leave and institutional or individual-level factors in this process.
Event-history analysis models make different assumptions about the shape
of the hazard function and its relationship with explanatory factors. There
are non-parametric, semi-parametric and parametric methods. In this anal-
ysis, it would be difficult to apply a parametric method, as there is very
limited information on the timing of parental leaves used by men in Luxem-
bourg. The report by the Luxembourg Ministry of Family and Integration
(2012) shows that, on average, women are more likely to use the “first” leave
available for the two parents, while men were much more likely to use the
“second” parental leave. For example, in 2012, men represented only 12.3
per cent of the users of the “first” parental leave and 87.7 per cent of the
users of the “second” parental. The Luxembourg parental leave scheme also
requires that the “first” leave in the family must be taken immediately after
the maternity leave, which continues for two or three months (three months
if the mother breastfeeds). Thus if the male partner of the couple is less
likely to be using the “first” leave, it could be expected that the slope of
the hazard rate will be relatively flat in the beginning and will be getting
steeper at the point after the period of the “first” parental leave, which if
8Multiple events of interest can be analyzed via competing risk models.
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taken full-time would be around the 8th or 9th month of the birth of child.
However, it is difficult to imagine how it will be distritbuted after this point
or to make any assumptions about the relationship of covariates and the
shape of the hazard function over time. Therefore, it would be a safe choice
to use a non-parametric or a semi-parametric model for the analysis.
The analysis in this study is broken into two parts. The first part is an
exploratory analysis, where the survival rate of all fathers in the sample is
estimated using the Kaplan-Meier estimation technique (explained in more
detail in the next section). In short, the Kaplan-Meier estimation technique
can be used to measure the duration until the event of interest(in this case
until the father takes parental leave) takes place. It is an especially appeal-
ing technique for the explorative part of the analysis, as it makes absolutely
no assumptions about either the shape of the hazard function or a poten-
tial relationship with covariates. As a first explanatory step, the survival
functions based on the Kaplan-Meier estimator are comparable across the
different levels of the main covariates of interest for the analysis: the two
measures of opportunity cost. Next, the analysis is extended to a multi-
variate level by applying a Cox proportional hazard model(Cox, 1972), a
semi-parametric method, which allows the inclusion of multiple covariates
(including time-varying covariates and time effects) at the same time.
Equation 1 displays one of the generic ways of writing the formula for
the Kaplan-Meier estimator. In this formula Sˆ(t) represent the estimated
cumulative probability of survival beyond time point t, ni denotes the total
number of observations who are “at risk” of experiencing the event (in the
first period these are all observations and in subsequent periods observations
which already experienced the event in the previous period and censored
observations are subtracted) and di stands for the number of data points
experiencing the event in period ti. Therefore Sˆ(t) is equal to the product
of the ratios of the number of observations who have not yet experienced
the event ni − di and the total number of observations at risk ni, whereby
censored cases are subtracted at the time period when they are censored.
Sˆ(t) =
∏
ti<t
ni − di
ni
(1)
The Kaplan-Meier estimator can be used to model the survival probability
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of the entire sample and to explore the relationship with categorical covari-
ates (one at a time), whereby the survival curves are plotted for groups
with different levels of the predictor variable. In this paper, I am using this
technique to explore the relationship between the two explanatory variables
relating to the opportunity cost of taking parental leave for the fathers. The
statistical significance of the difference between the survival probabilities
of the groups can be assessed via the log-rank test. Briefly said, the log-
rank test works by comparing the difference between observed and expected
number of events at each event time for the different levels of the predic-
tor variables (see Cleves, 2008, p.123). The log-rank test can be considered
equivalent to the score test from a semiparametric model under the assump-
tion of proportional hazards(see Harrell, 2001; Dalgaard, 2008, p.474,p.255).
This is the approach used in this study because the log-rank test is difficult
to estimate with time-varying covariates in the Survival Library (Therneau,
2012) in R (R Core Team, 2012).
For the multivariate analysis, I use the Cox proportional-hazards regression
model Joesch (]Cox1972. An overview of this model and a step-by-step guide
to its application with the free statistical and programming environment
R (R Core Team, 2012) is available in Mills (2011, chap. 5). The most
important feature of this method is that it does not make any assumption
about the shape of the hazard function, which makes it suitable for the
analysis of events whose distribution cannot be derived theoretically
Different notations are used in the literature for writing the formula for the
Cox proportional hazard model. In Fox (2002), the following formula is
presented, where i is the subscript denoting the different observations and
covariates are denoted as x’s:
hi(t) = h0(t)exp(β1xi1 + β2xik + ...+ βkxik) (2)
To make the model easier to understand Fox (2002) presents step by step
how the hazard ratios of two individuals can be presented. The hazard for
observation i is shown in Equation 3, while the hazard for observation i’ is
in Equation 4. Equation 5 shows how the hazard ratio for these observations
would look like, whereby one can observe that it is independent of time t.
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ηi = β1xi1 + β2xik + ...+ βkxik (3)
ηi′ = β1xi′1 + β2xi′k + ...+ βkxi′k (4)
hi(t)
hi′(t)
=
h0(t)e
ηi
h0(t)eηi′
=
One potential problem with this estimation technique is that it makes a
strong assumption that the hazard functions of groups defined by the ex-
planatory factors (e.g. low and high levels of the same covariate) remain
parallel over time. In other words, the ratio of the hazards of any two in-
dividuals from the data set is assumed to not vary over time. To test this
assumption, I use the Schoenfeld residuals (Schoenfeld, 1982) test, as sug-
gested in Mills (2011, chap.7). Schoenfeld residuals are described in Schoen-
feld (1982). Schoenfeld residuals are not residuals for the whole model, but
are computed for each individual for each covariate. When residuals are
plotted against time, their slope should be equal to zero if the assumption of
proportionality holds. The Schoenfeld residuals test is equivalent to testing
whether the slope of a regression of the scaled residuals on time would be
equal to 0 (UCLA: Statistical Consulting Group, 2013). The results of the
test are presented in Appendix D.
The results of the model estimated in this study suggest that a number of the
covariates in the analysis do not meet the proportional hazards assumption.
To correct this, I follow Joesch (1997) and include interactions between the
covariates and time in the model. In addition to this method, Mills and
Begall (2010) suggests that an alternative solution would be stratifying the
data. However, interactions with time have the advantage of allowing the
researcher to trace how the effect of the covariates changes over time.
Another potential problem with the analysis is whether the censored observa-
tions are random. Censoring means that there are incomplete records in the
data where information is missing either in the beginning (left-censoring) or
at the end of the observation period (right-censoring). With right-censored
observations, the problem is that it is not possible to know at what time pe-
riod (and if) they experience the event of interest, as their complete records
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are not available. In this analysis, I treat as censored observations these
cases that interrupt their social security record during the five-year period
of observation. Interrupting the social security record means that these per-
sons “disappear” from the data set. This could mean that they either stop
working or they start working in another country or in one of European in-
stitutions in Luxembourg. Technically, these persons also lose the right the
parental leave in Luxembourg, as they interrupt their employment relation-
ship. However, they could, in principle transfer the right to parental leave
in another country or re-gain it based on their future employment with an-
other employer. A potential problem with this analysis is that it is difficult
to say whether persons interrupting their employment in Luxembourg do so
“at random”. Therefore there is the risk that the assumption that censoring
is random may be violated.
A further note must be made about what observations are considered cen-
sored in this analysis. There are two types of cases: fathers who leave the
data set (and presumably their employment in Luxembourg) and do not re-
turn and fathers who re-appear after some time. For this analysis the second
type of censoring (middle censoring) poses a problem, however, these cases
cannot be fully incorporated into the Cox model9. To begin with, there
does not really exist an easily implemented solution on middle censoring.
Second, for middle-censored cases most of the information on covariates will
be missing also for earlier and subsequent time-periods, as the time-varying
covariates are recorded on an annul basis as of December the previous year.
Therefore, I decided to treat middle-censored observations as right-censored
and to use their information only until the first time they leave the data set.
In this way, I am analyzing their decision to take or not to take parental
leave until the point for which I have the full available information for them.
I must also note that I am making certain simplifications of the actual de-
cision of the father for this modeling. The first one is that I ignore the fact
that fathers can take more than one period of parental leave in the obser-
vation period (for example, if they have one more child). To address this
question, one could go into recurrent events modeling (see Mills, 2011, chap.
8). Second, I do not distinguish between full-time or part-time leave. This
distinction could be addressed via competing risk modeling (see Mills, 2011,
9There are some solutions already proposed in the literature conserving middle censor-
ing in parametric models. The interested reader is referred to Iyer, Jammalamadaka, and
Kundu (2008); Davarzani and Parsian (2011)
15
chap. 10). Third, the Luxembourg legislation explicitly states that both
parents in a family cannot be on parental leave at the same time. With
the available data it would be possible to match only a small fraction of
the men to their spouses as long as their spouse also works in Luxembourg.
Therefore, although including information on the behavior of the spouse
would have been very interesting, it proved not to be feasible in this case,
as it results in a selected sample where single men, men whose spouses do
not work or work in another country would be excluded. Finally, it must
be noted that this model does not make any corrections for non-observed
heterogeneity. Therefore, it is possible that there is a bias in the estimation
of the coefficients, if leave-taking behavior is correlated with other charac-
teristics, which also are related to the explanatory factors in the model. I
hope that future investigations of this question could extend the analysis
beyond these limitations.
All computations were performed using the Free Statistical and Program-
ming Environment R (R Core Team, 2012). For estimating the Cox propor-
tional hazards model, the Survival Library developed by Therneau (2012)
was used. Finally results were presented through the use of the Xtable
package, developed by
5 Measuring Opportunity Cost
5.1 Foregone Income
Opportunity cost in terms of foregone income was computed by subtracting
the benefit rate for each time-period from the total salary-related income of
each father in the analysis. Information on the salary-related income was
obtained from the IGSS records, while benefit rates were obtained from the
online information provided by the Luxembourg Statistical Portal (2013).
Both the salary and benefit figures were converted to 2005 EUR values
using the monthly Harmonized Consumer Price Indices (HCIP) provided
by Eurostat10 for Luxembourg.
All values of the opportunity cost were lagged six months. Using lagged
10http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/
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variables is commonly advised in event-history modeling with time-varying
variables. The reason is that without using lagged values causality can be
obscured. For example, parents’ salary-related income will naturally drop
in the month they take parental leave, as they will not receive their salary
any more. However, without using a lagged value of the variable, one can
incorrectly infer that lower salary-levels lead to a higher probability of taking
parental leave. In this analysis, I take the same reasoning a step further and
work with six-month lags, because in Luxembourg parental leave must be
applied for with the employer a minimum of six months before the desired
start date. While there is no way to know exactly when parents apply for
the leave, one can safely assume that both the parent and the employer
will be aware of a forthcoming parental leave period six month prior to its
start. As a result of the planned parental leave, the labor participation of
the parent can be affected, for example, they can be less likely to involved
in new projects with a foreseen longer time-frame, etc. Figure 1 displays
the distribution of the measure of opportunity cost described above. The
distribution is visibly not normal and rather skewed to the left. There
were many outliers in the data and in order to make the main body of the
distribution more visible and easier to interpret the top 5 per cent of the
values have been trimmed off.
For the multivariate analysis this variable was categorized for two main rea-
sons. First, there were many outliers in the data, representing fathers with
very high incomes. In 281254 of the person-months the recorded monthly op-
portunity cost was higher than two standard deviations 2*6816 EUR above
the mean 2812 EUR. This is not surprising for a high-income context like
Luxembourg, however, a large number of extreme values are known to pose
significant threats for the validity of results. To avoid the potentially con-
founding effects of these extreme values, I chose to put them together in the
highest-earning category. Second categorizing the variable allows for the
detection of non-linear effects. Logarithmic transformation of the variable
was also considered as an option to resolve the two issues mentioned before,
however dummy variables were chosen due to their more powerful ability to
detect non-linearity. The distribution of the categorized variable is displayed
in Appendix A.
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Figure 1: Opportunity cost of fathers to take parental leave terms of foregone
monthly salary-related income
5.2 Foregone Promotion Opportunities
The second measure of opportunity cost was constructed using the monthly
values of salary-related income converted in 2005 EUR as described in Sec-
tion 5.1. Average salary growth was computed using the formula displayed
in equation 6. With this equation, growth equal to 1 corresponds to no
changes in the salary. Values higher than 1 reflect positive growth or salary
increase and values lower than 1 reflect negative growth or salary decrease.
As salary-growth could, similar to salary-levels, be affected by the knowledge
of the employer and employee of a forthcoming parental leave, lagged values
of six months were used for the analysis. The average salary-related income
growth for the previous six months period ranged from 0 to 6 with 920 miss-
18
ing values11. It is difficult to say what the extreme values represnted, but
quite possible they reflected the presence of periods where no income was
recorded for a few months. It is possible that these periods represent unpaid
leave or unpaid internship employment, however, as these periods to do not
alter the social secutiry rights of the person they are not recorded specifi-
cally. Therefore, again, the variable was categorized whereby the lowest and
highest values could be grouped together. Categorization also has the added
advantage of allowing for the tracing of non-linear effects. The distribution
of the varaible is displayed in Figure 2. For creating the histogram, the top
and bottom 5 per cent of the values have been trimemd off - otherwise the
presence of extreme values made the graph less readable. The distribution
of the categorized variable is displayed in Appendix A.
Average monthly growth from period t to period s = (
waget
wages
)
1
t−s (6)
6 Descriptive Analysis
769 fathers from the 5827 fathers observed in the five-year period after a
child was born in their household took at least one parental leave. 666
are observations treated as censored because they do not have complete
administrative records. A table with the characteristics of the men in the
sample is provided in Appendix A.
6.1 Men Using Parental Leave Over Time
To gain an overall understanding of how the event of interest is distributed
over time, one could take advantage of the Kaplan-Meier curve, which is
11The mean values of the variable showed to vary significantly across years. It is possible
that the difference is due to macro-economic factors. To correct for this, I subtracted the
mean growth for all observation periods from each observation. When the variable was
entered in this format in the multivariate analysis, there were only minimal changes in the
coefficients, occuring after the second or third decimal sign. There were no changes in the
significance levels or in other coefficients. In view of this, I left the variable in its original
form for the analysis, as it made interpretation easier.
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Figure 2: Opportunity cost of fathers to take parental leave terms of presumed
salary related growth
commonly the starting point in survival analysis. The Kaplan-Meier curve,
is, in short a plot of the distribution of the survival rate throughout the
observation period. The survival rate is the fraction of cases who have not
yet experienced the event of interest at time t. In this case the event of
interest is taking parental leave. Therefore the survival rate is the fraction
of fathers who have not yet taken parental leave. The Kaplan-Meier curve
incorporates the information about censored observations. This is achieved
by considering each father “at risk” as long they are in observation, i.e. for
as long as they have a statistical record. The overall Kaplan-Meier curve
for the sample is shown in Figure 3. To read the figure, one must keep in
mind that the horizontal axis corresponds to time, while the vertical axis
corresponds to survival rate, or in other words the fraction of fathers who
have not yet taken parental leave. Please note that the vertical axis does not
start at zero, but at 0.80. Therefore the graph presents a “zoomed” view of
the survival curve. This presentation makes it easier to trace developments
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over time, as otherwise the curve appears rather flat and all developments
would be concentrated in the top part of the graph.
In Figure 3, the curve is flat for the first two months. This corresponds
to the two months after the birth of the child when the mother is still on
maternity leave and thus fathers are not able to take parental leave at this
time point. The first time-point when the slope of the curve becomes more
steep is around the second month. At around twelve months after the birth
of the child, there also seems to be an increased rate of parental leave taking.
Figure 3: Kaplan-Meier curve
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In the remaining part of the curve the slope is flattening, which means there
are fewer or no take up cases in that period.
6.2 Opportunity Cost and Taking Parental Leave Over Time
In this study, I measure opportunity cost of taking parental leave in two
ways: first in terms of the difference between the full-time benefit amount
and the salary-related income on a monthly basis and second in terms of
salary growth in a period of six months prior to any of the time-points
included in the analysis. To gain an understanding of how these two mea-
sures of opportunity cost may be related to the hazard of taking parental
leave over time, I draw the Kaplan-Meier curves at their different levels.
The Kaplan-Meier curves are displayed in Figures 4 and 5. It must be
noted that the Kaplan-Meier curves can provide only an initial insight into
the association, as they do not control for any other characteristics of the
fathers.
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Figure 4: The Kaplan-Meier curve for men taking parental leave according to
salary-related opportunity cost
Figure 4 displays the survival rates (the proportions of fathers who have
not taken parental leave) along the sixty months of observation for fathers
with different levels of salary-related opportunity costs. Note that the values
are lagged six months, as explained in the previous section, as this is the
time frame within which parental leave must be formally applied for. In
Figure 4 we see that the group with the lowest survival rate (i.e. with
the highest fraction of men taking parental leave) is the group for which the
opportunity cost would be positive, but below 500 EUR per month. In terms
of probability to take parental leave, this group is followed by the group with
23
an opportunity cost between 500 and 1000 EUR and 1000 to 1500 EUR. The
relationship between salary-related opportunity cost and taking parental
leave is clearly non-linear, as the group with a negative opportunity cost
(i.e. earning less than the full-time benefit amount per month) has a higher
survival rate than the three before-mentioned groups. The group with the
highest survival rate appears to be the one where the opportunity cost would
be over 5000 EUR per month. The results from the score test from a Cox
proportional hazard model with opportunity cost as the only variable in the
model12 suggests that the difference is significant(χ2 = 138.5, df = 9, p = 0).
However, Figure 4 also displays that the difference between the groups
does not remain constant over time. This means that the assumption of
proportional hazards is violated. This might affect the validity of the score
test and pose a a problem for the multivariate analysis applying the Cox
proportionate hazards model.
Figure 5 displays the survival rates across time for fathers with different
levels of salary growth in the previous six months. The group with lowest
survival rate seems to be the group with the third lowest rate of salary-
growth (0.994 to 0.9976). This level of salary growth is negative and, in
fact, indicates a decrease in the salary-related income level. The group with
even higher decrease of salary growth (0.973 to 0.994), seems to be the
group with slightly lower survival rate, but relatively higher than the rest,
especially after month 30th. The other groups seems to have almost the
same survival rates. The results from the score test from a Cox proportional
hazard model with salary growth as the only variable in the model13 suggests
that the difference is significant(χ2 = 17.36, df = 7, p = 0.015).
12under the proportional hazards assumption this is a test equivalent to the log-rank
test, see Section 4.2
13under the proportional hazards assumption this is a test equivalent to the log-rank
test, see Section 4.2
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Figure 5: The Kaplan-Meier curve for men taking parental leave according to
salary-growth in past six months
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7 Multivariate Results
To examine the effect of a number of covariates on the probability that a
father will take parental leave over time, I use a Cox proportional hazards
model with time-varying and fixed covariates. The results are displayed in
Table 3. The table is organized as follows. The first column displays the
names of the variables entered into the analysis. The second column displays
the exponentiated values of the coefficients, which are in fact the hazard ra-
tios. Hazard ratios greater than one indicate a positive association between
the predictor variable and the hazard of the event, in this case, a greater
chance of taking parental leave. Negative relationships are indicated by haz-
ard ratios smaller than one, in this case, this means that as the value of the
predictor increases, there are less chances for the father to take parental
leave. The significance of the hazard ratios is displayed in column three.
Column four presents the exponentiated values of the coefficients of interac-
tion terms between time and these predictors, which were identified to have
non-constant effects over time by the Schoenfield residuals test, displayed in
Appendix D. The significance of the interactions terms is shown in the last
column. Coefficients of predictors where time interactions are present in the
model should be interpreted after multiplying the two interactions together.
The hazard ratios of the dummy variables for the first measure of oppor-
tunity cost - foregone income - seem to decrease, as the dummy variables
increase, although significant differences are only observed between the ref-
erence group (where opportunity cost would be 1500−2000 EUR per month)
and the groups of fathers for whom the opportunity cost would be lower than
1500 EUR per month who all have a higher probability than the reference to
use parental leave. Higher earning fathers, however, do not have significantly
lower probabilities than the reference group to use parental leave, except the
group of very high-earners, where the opportunity cost would exceed 5000
EUR per month. The Schoenfield residuals test did not suggest a violation
of the proportional hazards assumption, so the variable was assumed to have
the same effect over time and interactions with time were not included in the
model. To sum up, although the coefficients are monotonically decreasing,
the p-values suggest some kind of non-linearity in the relationship between
foregone income and taking parental leave, whereby the association is more
prominent at the two extreme ends of distribution of foregone income. These
results offer a partial support to the hypothesis tested in this study, whereby
it was expected that higher levels of opportunity cost would be associated
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with a lower hazard of taking parental leave.
The second measure of opportunity cost, averaged salary growth in the past
six months, also yielded non-linear results. The expectation for this vari-
able was that fathers who have a higher levels of salary growth in preceding
periods of six month would have a lower hazard of taking parental leave, as
this would suggest a potentially higher level of foregone promotion opportu-
nities. The results are somewhat mixed, however, the overall trend is that
the relationship runs in the opposite direction. The reference group for this
variable was chosen to be fathers with average growth rates between 1.001
and 1.004. With the exception of the coefficient of the third group (0.994
to 0.9976), the coefficients seem to increase - that is higher levels of growth,
relative to the reference group, are associated with more instances of taking
parental leave over time. The coefficients are significant, however, only for
the difference between the reference category and the third group (0.994 to
0.9976) and the groups with higher levels of growth, above (1.004). The
relationship was not constant over-time, evident in the Schoenfield residu-
als test (see Appendix D) and the significant (negative, except for the first
group) interactions with time (see columns 4 and 5 in Table 3), suggesting
that with time, the difference between these groups and the reference group
tends to decrease.
The correlation between the two measures of opportunity cost was tested
using Kendall’s tau-b coefficient. This method was chosen because the vari-
ables were entered into the Cox model as sets of dummies and not in their
continuous forms. Spearman’s rho statistic could not be applied in this par-
ticular case because there were ties in the data. The value of Kendall’s tau-b
coefficient was estimated to be 0.131, which was statistically significant (z
= 95.47, p < 0.001).
Monthly hours of work yielded somewhat surprising results. The reference
group was chosen to represent men working exactly 173 hours per month.
In Luxmebourg, this is the standard working hours per month figure. Fa-
thers working less than that, were grouped together as “part-timers”, while
these working more than 173 hours were grouped together as “overtimers”.
It must be noted that in Luxembourg, typically, only blue-collar workers
are expected to record their exact hours of work. For white-collars and
civil servants, overtime hours of work measure the contracted hours and not
necessarily the hours actually working. The distribution of hours worked
according to category of employment is displayed in Table 1. The percent-
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ages are calculated across rows and indicate that, indeed, blue collar workers
are most likely to have overtime working hours, while civil servants almost
always have standard working hours of 173 hours per month. It must also be
noted that for many of the fathers in the dataset, the working hours repre-
sent the combined working hours from a number of working places. In some
cases, these different working places can have different categories. These sit-
uations were solved by using the category of the workplace where the father
worked the majority of hours per month. Unfortunately due to the large
number of missing cases, the variable could not be directly included in the
analysis.
<173 173 173+ Missing Values Total
Value Per Cent Per Cent Per Cent Per Cent Count
Blue Collars 22 59 19 0 142353
White Collars 27 16 58 0 118962
Civil Servants 2 94 4 0 33181
Missing Values 27 33 23 17 2074
Total(Count) 63571 134430 98069 500 296570
Table 1: Distribution of monthly working hours according to category of employ-
ment
The other work-related variable in the analysis, size of the enterprize, seemed
to have an effect consistent with previous findings, whereby persons working
in very large enterprizes (over 1000 employees) had the highest hazard of
taking leave compared to the reference group working in large enterprizes.
The hazard for fathers working small enterprizes was significantly less than
for these in the reference group (large enterprizes with employees between
200 and 1000)
Family-related variables showed effects consistent with expectations based
on previous studies. Fathers were more likely to use parental leave when
the child born was the first one. The hazard of taking leave for the second
child was only 60 per cent of that for the first child and for the third or
higher parity only 30 per cent. However, these results can be interpreted
28
directly only for households where there are no other children under five
years old. The two variables must be interpreted in conjunction with each
other because throughout the observation period, the variable recording the
number of children in the family can take different values reflecting the
births of more children in the family. The presence of other children than
the child born in 2003 under five years old in the household had a significant
positive effect on the hazard of taking leave, whereby the hazard for a father
to take leave was more than three times higher if there were three or more
small children in the family compared to none or only one. The combined
interpretation of the two variables is that fathers are more likely to use the
parental leave for the first child. However, if there are two or three birth
close to each other, which results in the presence of small children under
five during the observation period, then fathers are more likely to use the
leave. Therefore, it seems like not only birth order, but also the spacing of
births play a role in the decisions of fathers and the effects are running in
somewhat counter-balancing directions.
There did not seem to be any differences associated with multiple births
(twins or triplets) or with the gender of the child. Finally the variable indi-
cating the marital status of the fathers in the sample showed no significant
difference between non-married (single, divorced, cohabitant or widowed)
fathers and married fathers. However, fathers for whom it was not the first
marriage (re-married) were significantly less likely to take leave compared
to single fathers.
With regards to the marital status variable, the results were quite interest-
ing, as no difference was found between married and non-married fathers
with regards to taking parental leave. Luxembourg provides a legal alterna-
tive to marriage, known as a Partenariat (PACS), which provides the same
tax, civil and social security rights as marriage. However, in the administra-
tive data co-habiting couples are coded as “not married” and it is not possi-
ble to find the difference between single and cohabiting fathers. In addition,
Luxembourg does not recognize registered partnerships in other countries.
Therefore co-habiting couples from other countries are also considered as
single persons. This is illustrated in Table 2, which shows that from the fa-
thers living in Luxembourg only 3 per cent are not married, while for fathers
in other countries of residence this number can be over 40 per cent. Due to
the almost perfect correlation between nationality and residence (virtually
all Luxmebourgish nationals in the sample reside in Luxembourg), it was
not possible to include residence in the analysis separately.
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Not Married Married Re-Married Missing Values Total
Value Per Cent Per Cent Per Cent Per Cent Count
Belgium 17 79 4 0 29213
France 42 56 2 0 55493
Germany 24 71 5 0 14581
Luxembourg 3 89 8 0 156798
Other 44 51 5 0 1270
Missing Values 0 0 0 100 39215
Total(count) 37474 203995 15886 39215 296570
Table 2: Distribution of marital status by nationality
The model also controlled for nationality and age. The effect of age was pos-
itive and significant, however, there was a negative and significant quadratic
effect. Thus older fathers tended to have a higher hazard of taking leave. Af-
ter a certain age, however, the relationship revered and older fathers when
they tended to have a lower hazard. Including nationality in the model
revealed that relative to Luxembourgish fathers, Portuguese fathers and fa-
thers with nationalities other than the ones included in the grouping were
less likely to use parental leave. For both groups, the differences seemed
to slightly increase with time, as there were positive and significant time
interactions.
The model was estimated on a 253431 number of spells, with a total of
729 events occurring. The method used for resolving ties was the Efron
approximation. The log likelihood ratio test is significant (-2LogLikelihood
= 1217, df=52, p<0.001), meaning that the coefficient of at least one of the
covariates is different from 0. The Akaike Information Criteria (AIC) of the
model equalled 11225.5.
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coefficient(exp) p time-interaction(exp) p
Salary Opportunity Cost: Negative 2.82 0 - -
Salary Opportunity Cost: <500 EUR 5.556 0 - -
Salary Opportunity Cost: 500-1000 EUR 2.875 0 - -
Salary Opportunity Cost: 1000-1500 EUR 1.198 0.32 - -
Salary Opportunity Cost: 2000-2500 EUR 0.717 0.103 - -
Salary Opportunity Cost: 2500-3000 EUR 0.789 0.267 - -
Salary Opportunity Cost: 3000-4000 EUR 0.718 0.096 - -
Salary Opportunity Cost: 4000-5000 EUR 0.773 0.245 - -
Salary Opportunity Cost: 5000+ 0.488 0 - -
Salary Growth in past 6 months:(0,0.973] 0.86 0.549 1.002 0.867
Salary Growth in past 6 months:(0.973,0.994] 1.442 0.114 0.992 0.365
Salary Growth in past 6 months:(0.994,0.9976] 1.818 0.014 0.983 0.071
Salary Growth in past 6 months:(0.9976,1.001] 1.191 0.447 0.999 0.898
Salary Growth in past 6 months:(1.004,1.011] 1.598 0.048 0.984 0.082
Salary Growth in past 6 months:(1.011,1.034] 1.642 0.04 0.976 0.019
Salary Growth in past 6 months:(1.034,5.591] 2.147 0.002 0.985 0.115
Monthly Working Hours: <173 1.628 0 - -
Monthly Working Hours: 173+ 1.409 0.001 - -
Birth Order: Second 0.599 0 - -
Birth Order: Third+ 0.37 0 - -
Child Sex: Male 0.906 0.187 - -
Multiple Births 0.926 0.779 - -
Nationality: France 1.18 0.344 0.989 0.178
Nationality: Portugal 0.338 0 1.032 0
Nationality: Belgium 0.969 0.876 1.004 0.651
Nationality: Germany 0.745 0.419 1.007 0.651
Nationality: Other 0.501 0.001 1.03 0
Age 1.161 0.03 - -
Squared Age 0.998 0.032 - -
Marital Status: Married 0.994 0.975 1.022 0.036
Marital Status: Re-married 0.42 0.021 1.046 0.003
Children under Five: 2 1.978 0 0.986 0.022
Children under Five: 3+ 3.199 0.001 0.987 0.312
Size Enterprize: Medium(50-200) 0.802 0.205 - -
Size Enterprize: Small(<50) or Not Applicable 0.802 0.161 - -
Size Enterprize: Very Large(1000+) 10.178 0 - -
Table 3: Cox Proportional Hazard Model with Time Interactions. Reference
Categories: Salary Opportunity Cost 1500-2000 EUR, Negative Salary Growth(past
six month), Birth Order: First, Child Sex: Female, Nationality: Luxembourg,
Marital Status: Single, Divorced or Widow, Children under Five: None or One,
Size of the Enterprize: Large(500-1000)
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8 Discussion
The main finding of the paper is that income-related opportunity costs have
a non-linear effect on fathers’ use of parental leave. Measuring opportunity
cost in terms of foregone earnings revealed that fathers with lower opportu-
nity cost were more likely to take parental leave than the group for whom
the opportunity cost would be between 1500 and 2000 EUR per month. For
the higher income groups, there appeared to be no significant differences,
except in the case of the extreme high-earners (for whom the opportunity
cost would be more than 5000 EUR per month), who were least likely to
use parental leave. Supplementing this variable with the measure of the
average salary-growth in the previous six months, aimed at controlling for
developments in the income trajectory of the fathers. The hypothesis was
that fathers who are experiencing a period of salary growth would be less
likely to take parental leave, as they will face a higher opportunity cost in
terms of foregone salary-growth opportunities during the leave. While the
relationship is exactly not linear, the results indicate that this is not nec-
essarily the case. The reference group was the group of father experiencing
a very slightly positive growth (ranging from 1.001 to 1.004). All groups of
fathers experiencing higher levels of growth were more likely to take parental
leave, however, with time the difference tended to become less pronounced.
This result is contrary to what was expected. One possible interpretation is
that fathers prefer to take parental leave when they have reached a relatively
higher position in their work and thus evaluate that they are in a more stable
situation, so that they can afford the (possible)income-reduction associated
with the leave.
The control variables also revealed some interesting patterns. Fathers work-
ing with standard working-hours contracts of 173 hours, were less likely to
use parental leave than fathers working part-time or over-time. Consistent
with previous research, fathers working in larger organizations had a higher
probability of taking parental leave. On the family level, there were no sig-
nificant effects for multiple births and the gender of the child. Fathers were
more likely to use parental leave if the child born in 2003 was the first child,
however, when there were more children in the family under the age of five,
they were also more likely to use the leave. Age seemed to be non-linearly
related to taking parental leave, whereby younger fathers tended to be more
likely to take leave until a point, in which the coefficient would start to de-
cline. Relative to Luxembourgish men, fathers of Portuguese nationality or
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one of the less represented nationalities were less likely to use leave. There
were no significant differences between Luxembourgish, Belgian, French and
German fathers.
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A Distribution of Covariates
Table 4: Distribution of Covariates
Variable Count Per cent Events
Salary Opportunity Cost
Negative 15693 5.29 96
< 500 EUR 43103 14.53 199
500-1000 EUR 44575 15.03 124
1000-1500 EUR 35145 11.85 69
1500-2000 EUR (reference) 27185 9.17 60
2000-2500 EUR 24176 8.15 44
2500-3000 EUR 19736 6.65 38
3000-4000 EUR 27941 9.42 48
4000-5000 EUR 18210 6.14 35
5000+ EUR 40306 13.59 56
Missing Values 500 0.17 0
Salary Growth in past 6 months
(0,0.973] 36957 12.46 83
(0.973,0.994] 36956 12.46 114
(0.994,0.9976] 37434 12.62 107
(0.9976,1.001] 36478 12.3 103
(1.001, 1.004](reference) 36996 12.47 101
(1.004,1.011] 36916 12.45 95
(1.011,1.034] 36956 12.46 82
(1.034,5.591] 36957 12.46 83
Missing Values 920 0.31 1
Monthly Working Hours
< 173 63571 21.44 279
173 (reference) 134430 45.33 285
173+ 98069 33.07 205
Missing Values 500 0.17 0
Birth Order
First (reference) 114614 38.65 400
Second 91129 30.73 245
Third + 51612 17.4 94
Missing Values 39215 13.22 30
Child Sex
Female (reference) 139351 46.99 376
continued . . .
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. . . continued
Variable Count Per cent Events
Male 157219 53.01 393
Missing Values 0 0 0
Multiple Births
Single Birth (reference) 290615 97.99 754
Twins or triplets 5955 2.01 15
Missing Values 0 0 0
Nationality
Luxembourg (reference) 92465 31.18 303
France 72459 24.43 156
Portugal 38117 12.85 84
Belgium 41575 14.02 95
Germany 19626 6.62 24
Other 32320 10.9 107
Missing Values 8 0 0
Age
Mean 35.93 - -
SD 5.4 - -
Min 19 - -
Max 65 - -
Missing Values 8 0 0
Marital Status
Not Married (reference) 37474 12.64 80
Married 203995 68.78 624
Re-Married 15886 5.36 35
Missing Values 39215 13.22 30
(Other) Children under Five
None (reference) 174582 58.87 451
One 76709 25.87 262
Two+ 6064 2.04 26
Missing Values 39215 13.22 30
Size Enterprize
Micro/Small <50 or Not Appl 75381 25.42 100
Medium: 50-200 55886 18.84 64
Large: 200-1000 (reference) 59025 19.9 69
Very Large: 1000+ 63567 21.43 497
Missing Values 42711 14.4 39
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B Construction of Covariates
Variable Description Construction
Notes
Salary Opportunity Cost - -
Salary Growth in past 6
months
- -
Monthly Working Hours Monthly working hours could reflect either
contracted hours (white-collar workers) or
actual worked hours (blue-collar workers).
The standard employment contract in Lux-
embourg is 173 hours/month, so this value
was chosen as the reference category for the
multivariate analysis
Information about working hours is provided on monthly basis. In case a person has
several employers all hours were summed together. There were observations (person-
months) where hours were very extreme, over 300 per month, which could have reflected
past payments due together or measurement errors. By categorizing the variable, these
extreme values were all included in the category working 173+ hours.
Birth Order This variable measures whether there were
other children in the household when the
baby was born in 2003.
The variable was constructed using annual-based data provided by the IGSS. In the
annual-based data, persons are matched to households based on tax-related information.
Birth order was computed based on these “fiscal” households. Any children 18 years-old
or under were counted in 2003. In rare cases it is possible that the “fiscal” household
does not represent a family that actually lives together. It is also not possible to know if
children in the “fiscal” household are biological children of the two adults.
Child Sex Male or Female This variable was constructed based on the annual-based IGSS information.
Multiple Births Twins and triplets were counted as ”multiple
births”
This variable was constructed based on the annual-based IGSS information.
Nationality The most common nationalities are listed
separately, others are grouped together.
This variable was constructed based on the annual-based IGSS information. Nationality
does not necessarily correspond to ethnicity.
Age Age measured in years, time-varying covari-
ate
The variable was constructed from the year of birth.
Children under Five Time-varying covariate, which counts the
number of children under five, excluding the
baby born in 2003
This variable was constructed based on the annual-based IGSS information. Not possible
to find out if children in the “fiscal” household are biological children.
Size of the Enterprize Time-varying covariate, recording the num-
ber of employees in the enterprize
Variable extracted from IGSS annual-based records. Status corresponds to December in
the previous year.
Table 5: Notes on the Construction of Control Variables
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C Cox Proportional Hazards Model without Time
Interactions
coef exp(coef) se(coef) z p
Salary Opportunity Cost: Negative 1.00 2.72 0.18 5.50 0.00
Salary Opportunity Cost: <500 EUR 1.70 5.49 0.16 10.55 0.00
Salary Opportunity Cost: 500-1000 EUR 1.05 2.85 0.17 6.30 0.00
Salary Opportunity Cost: 1000-1500 EUR 0.19 1.21 0.18 1.05 0.29
Salary Opportunity Cost: 2000-2500 EUR -0.35 0.71 0.20 -1.69 0.09
Salary Opportunity Cost: 2500-3000 EUR -0.25 0.77 0.21 -1.19 0.23
Salary Opportunity Cost: 3000-4000 EUR -0.34 0.71 0.20 -1.73 0.08
Salary Opportunity Cost: 4000-5000 EUR -0.27 0.76 0.22 -1.22 0.22
Salary Opportunity Cost: 5000+ -0.74 0.48 0.20 -3.73 0.00
Salary Growth in past 6 months:(0,0.973] -0.12 0.89 0.15 -0.76 0.44
Salary Growth in past 6 months:(0.973,0.994] 0.20 1.22 0.14 1.39 0.16
Salary Growth in past 6 months:(0.994,0.9976] 0.25 1.29 0.14 1.76 0.08
Salary Growth in past 6 months:(0.9976,1.001] 0.13 1.14 0.15 0.89 0.37
Salary Growth in past 6 months:(1.004,1.011] 0.13 1.14 0.15 0.89 0.37
Salary Growth in past 6 months:(1.011,1.034] 0.05 1.05 0.16 0.33 0.74
Salary Growth in past 6 months:(1.034,5.591] 0.47 1.60 0.16 2.99 0.00
Monthly Working Hours: <173 0.48 1.62 0.10 4.89 0.00
Monthly Working Hours: 173+ 0.34 1.41 0.11 3.23 0.00
Birth Order: Second -0.41 0.66 0.09 -4.54 0.00
Birth Order: Third+ -0.89 0.41 0.13 -7.07 0.00
Child Sex: Male -0.11 0.90 0.07 -1.41 0.16
Multiple Births -0.10 0.90 0.27 -0.38 0.70
Nationality: France -0.03 0.97 0.12 -0.29 0.77
Nationality: Portugal -0.44 0.64 0.14 -3.11 0.00
Nationality: Belgium 0.04 1.04 0.13 0.29 0.77
Nationality: Germany -0.17 0.85 0.23 -0.73 0.47
Nationality: Other -0.10 0.90 0.13 -0.83 0.41
Age 0.13 1.14 0.07 1.89 0.06
Squared Age -0.00 1.00 0.00 -1.88 0.06
Marital Status: Married 0.34 1.41 0.13 2.63 0.01
Marital Status: Re-married -0.03 0.97 0.22 -0.12 0.90
Children under Five: 2 0.38 1.47 0.09 4.44 0.00
Children under Five: 3+ 0.80 2.23 0.21 3.81 0.00
Size Enterprize: Medium(50-200) -0.23 0.79 0.17 -1.34 0.18
Size Enterprize: Small(<50) or Not Applicable -0.23 0.80 0.16 -1.44 0.15
Size Enterprize: Very Large(1000+) 2.30 9.99 0.13 17.05 0.00
Table 6: The model without time-interactions
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D Testing the Proportional Hazard Assumption
rho chisq sig
Salary Opportunity Cost: Negative 0.01 0.02
Salary Opportunity Cost: <500 EUR 0.01 0.07
Salary Opportunity Cost: 500-1000 EUR 0.03 0.48
Salary Opportunity Cost: 1000-1500 EUR -0.03 0.49
Salary Opportunity Cost: 2000-2500 EUR 0.01 0.04
Salary Opportunity Cost: 2500-3000 EUR 0.02 0.20
Salary Opportunity Cost: 3000-4000 EUR -0.03 0.75
Salary Opportunity Cost: 4000-5000 EUR 0.01 0.06
Salary Opportunity Cost: 5000+ 0.01 0.05
Salary Growth in past 6 months:(0,0.973] 0.00 0.01
Salary Growth in past 6 months:(0.973,0.994] -0.02 0.40
Salary Growth in past 6 months:(0.994,0.9976] -0.07 3.35 .
Salary Growth in past 6 months:(0.9976,1.001] -0.00 0.02
Salary Growth in past 6 months:(1.004,1.011] -0.07 3.73 .
Salary Growth in past 6 months:(1.011,1.034] -0.08 4.88 *
Salary Growth in past 6 months:(1.034,5.591] -0.06 2.24
Monthly Working Hours: <173 -0.02 0.29
Monthly Working Hours: 173+ -0.02 0.40
Birth Order: Second 0.01 0.08
Birth Order: Third+ -0.00 0.01
Child Sex: Male 0.01 0.05
Multiple Births 0.02 0.43
Nationality: France -0.04 1.16
Nationality: Portugal 0.13 12.08 ***
Nationality: Belgium 0.02 0.38
Nationality: Germany 0.03 0.64
Nationality: Other 0.14 14.62 ***
Age -0.00 0.01
Squared Age -0.00 0.00
Marital Status: Married 0.07 3.03 .
Marital Status: Re-married 0.10 7.53 *
Children under Five: 2 -0.09 6.20 *
Children under Five: 3+ -0.05 1.90
Size Enterprize: Medium(50-200) 0.02 0.36
Size Enterprize: Small(<50) or Not Applicable 0.01 0.10
Size Enterprize: Very Large(1000+) 0.06 3.18 .
GLOBAL 79.41 ***
Table 7: Proportional hazards assumption test. Significance codes:∗ ∗ ∗p <
0.001, ∗ ∗ p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05, .p < 0.1 Significant coefficients suggest that the
hazard rates for the groups compared by the different levels of the variable are
not constant. To correct for this violation of the proportional hazards assumption,
these variables are included in the model together with interactions with time.
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